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Plausible Deniability in Web Search – From
Detection to Assessment
Po´l Mac Aonghusa and Douglas J. Leith
Abstract—Web personalisation uses what systems know about
us to create content targeted at our interests. When unwanted
personalisation suggests we are interested in sensitive or embar-
rassing topics a natural reaction is to deny interest. This is a
practical response only if denial of our interest is credible or
plausible. Adopting a definition of plausible deniability in the
usual sense of “on the balance of probabilities”, we develop a
practical and scalable tool called PDE allowing a user to decide
when their ability to plausibly deny interest in sensitive topics is
compromised. We show that threats to plausible deniability are
readily detectable for all topics tested in an extensive testing
program. Of particular concern is observation of threats to
deniability of interest in topics related to health and sexual
preferences. We show this remains the case when attempting
to disrupt search engine learning through noise query injection
and click obfuscation. We design a defence technique exploiting
uninteresting, proxy topics and show that it provides a more
effective defence of plausible deniability in our experiments.
Index Terms—Privacy, Indistinguishability, Plausible Deni-
ability, Recommender Systems, Web Search.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encountering inappropriate or unwanted personalised on-
line content can be awkward, depending on social context.
What may appear humorous in one situation may be em-
barrassing, or worse, in another context. When presented
with content regarded as inappropriate or discreditable, a
user may wish to deny interest in the content.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines plausible deni-
ability in terms of reasonable doubt as “the possibility of
denying a fact (especially a discreditable action) without
arousing suspicion”, [1]. Informally, user activity observed
by the search engine exhibits plausible deniability when
user activity is consistent with the user interest in any one
of several topics, at least one of which is not sensitive for
the user, with sufficiently high probability.
Accordingly, we assess threats to plausible deniability
during web search by testing if content appearing on
search result pages can be attributed to user interest in
a specific sensitive topic, versus user interest in any other
topic, on the balance of probabilities. We ask when can a
user plausibly deny interest in a range of sensitive topics
during online web-search sessions?
We provide guarantees on the best-possible level of plau-
sible deniability a user can expect during web search in our
model. We also introduce a new Plausible Deniability Esti-
mator, called PDE, that can be used to assess privacy threats.
Outputs from PDE can be represented in terms of readily
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interpretable probabilities thereby providing an informative
indication of risk to the user.
Our methods are chosen to be straightforward to implement
using openly available technologies. We use our results to
design and assess counter-measures against threats to plau-
sible deniability during online web-search sessions, using the
Google Search as a source of data. We are able to assess
threats to plausible deniability from sensitive topic learning in
a range of potentially sensitive topics, such as health, finance
and sexual orientation.
Our experimental measurements indicate that, by observing
as few as 3-5 revealing queries, a search engine can infer a user
is interested in a sensitive topic on the balance of probabilities
in 100% of topics tested when no effective defence is provided.
In the case of topics related to health and sexual preferences
measurements from PDE suggest that the probability a user is
interested in sensitive topics related to sexual preference is as
high as 90% greater than their probability of interest in any
other topic.
We show that defence strategies based on random query
injection of random noise queries and misleading click patterns
may provide some protection for individual, isolated queries,
but that search engines are able to learn quickly. Significant
levels of threat to plausible deniability are detected even when
very high levels of random noise are included in the query
session or when misleading click patterns are used. These
approaches seem to offer little or no improvement to user
privacy when considering plausible deniability over the longer
term.
In contrast, we find that a defence employing topics that
are commercially relevant but uninteresting to the user as
proxy topics is effective in protecting plausible deniability
in the case of 100% of sensitive topics tested. The proxy
topic defence differs from traditional obfuscation approaches
in actively exploiting the observed ability of the search engine
to learn topics quickly, deflecting the focus of interest toward
the proxy topic and away from the true topic of interest to the
user.
The proxy topic defence works in our experiments, and is
simple to apply. However it is important to recognise that
we are faced with commercially motivated and increasingly
powerful systems with a history of adapting quickly. Our
results suggest that search engine capability is continuously
evolving so that we can reasonably expect search engines to
respond to privacy defences with more sophisticated learning
strategies. Our results also point towards the fact that the text
in search queries plays a key role in search engine learning.
While perhaps obvious, this observation reinforces the user’s
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need to be circumspect about the queries they ask if they want
to avoid search engine learning of their interests. Equally, our
results suggest that simple countermeasures, such as proxy
topics, that make accurate personalisation more expensive
for the online system represent a promising approach in
developing new techniques for practical user privacy.
II. RELATED WORK
We model a search engine as a black-box by making minimal
assumptions about its internal workings. The technique of
using predefined probe queries, injected at intervals into a
stream of true user queries as fixed sampling points, was
used in [2] where the focus of the paper was detection
of possible privacy threats. Extending the idea of probe
queries, discussed in [2], several new applications are
presented in this current paper such as the model of
plausible deniability and the associated PDE estimator, the
proxy topic defence model and the evaluation of multiple
noise and click models for each of these. The technique
of using predefined probe queries is borrowed from black-box
testing. Modelling an adversary as a black-box, where internal
details of recommender systems algorithms and settings are
unknown to users, is mentioned in [3] and [4].
The importance of control over appropriate flow of infor-
mation is discussed extensively in legal and social science
fields. Individual control over personal information flow is
discussed in a critique of the nothing to hide defence for
widespread surveillance in [5]. Individual privacy and its social
consequences are discussed in [6], [7], where agency or control
over appropriate disclosure is identified as a key concern.
Plausible deniability as a privacy defence for web search
is addressed in the literature. In [8] alternative, less revealing
queries are mixed with sensitive topic queries to obfuscate
true user interest. In [9] queries with generalised terms are
used to approximate the search results of a true query, which
is never revealed. Plausible deniability for database release
has been studied in the context of user data anonymization.
For example, in [10] a definition of plausible deniability is
applied to examine mechanisms for differentially private data
set release. More generally, plausible deniability to counteract
the impact of personalisation is examined in [11] for the case
of a privacy aware user who knows they are being observed.
The authors show that no matter what the behaviour of the user
is, it is always compatible with some concern over privacy. In
this way the user can offer their awareness of privacy concerns
as a general alibi to justify any range of preferences. Plausible
deniability for providers of online services is also discussed
in the literature. For example, in [12] a distributed virtual
machine infrastructure is used to provide deniability to online
data providers by obfuscating the origin of index data used in
recommendations.
The potential of online profiling and personalisation result-
ing in censorship and discrimination have received growing
attention in the research literature. Personalisation as a form
of censorship – termed a filter bubble in [13] – is explored
in [4]. In a filter bubble, a user cannot access subsets of
information because the recommender system algorithm has
decided it is irrelevant for that user. In [4] a filter bubble effect
was detected in the case of Google Web Search in a test with
200 users. Discrimination associated with personalisation has
been shown for topics generally regarded as sensitive. In [14]
an extensive review of adverts from Google and Reuters.com
showed a strong correlation between adverts suggestive of an
arrest record, and, an individual’s ethnicity. In [15], the authors
used online advertising targeted exclusively to gay men to
demonstrate strong profiling in the case of sexual preference.
Several approaches exist for obfuscating user interactions
with search engines with the aim of disrupting online profiling
and personalisation. GooPIR, [16], [17], attempts to disguise
a user’s “true” queries by adding masking keywords directly
into a true query before submitting to a recommender system.
Results are then filtered to extract items that are relevant to
the user’s original true query. PWS, [18], and TrackMeNot,
[19], [20], inject distinct noise queries into the stream of true
user queries during a user query session, seeking to achieve
an acceptable level of anonymity while not overly upsetting
overall utility. Search engine algorithm evolution regarded as
a continuous “arms-race”, is evidenced in the case of Google,
for example, by major algorithm changes such as Caffeine
and Search+ Your World have included additional sources of
background knowledge from Social Media, improved filtering
of content such as Panda to counter spam and content manipu-
lation, most recently semantic search capability has been added
through Knowledge Graph and HummingBird, [21], [22], [23].
Consent to share data for agreed purposes is critical
to user trust in service providers and is a key feature
of the EU General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR),
[24]. Several notable browser add-ons, such as Mozilla
Lightbeam, [25], and PrivacyBadger, [26], facilitate more
active user awareness of possible consent issues by helping
a user understand where their data is shared with third
parties through the sites they visit. XRay, [27], reports
high accuracy in identifying which sources of user data
such as email or web search history might have triggered
particular results from online services such as adverts.
Active consensual sharing of personal data is investigated
in [28] through an in-browser capability, called RePriv,
allowing a user to select which portions of their personal
data they wish to share with requesters. Both PrivAd, [29],
and Adnostic, [30] investigate safe profiling through gen-
eralisation of user interests in the browser. Both Adnostic
and PrivAd seek to protect the true interests of the user
by obfuscating and filtering personalised content through
a published interface.
Evaluation of the effectiveness of privacy defences in the
wild was performed by [31] in the case of TrackMeNot
where the authors demonstrate that by using only a short-term
history of search queries it is possible to break the privacy
guarantees of TrackMeNot using readily available machine-
learning classifiers. The importance of background information
in user profiling is explored in [32]. Here a similarity metric
measuring distance between known background information
about a user, given by query history, and subsequent queries
is shown to identify 45.3% of TrackMeNot and 51.6% of
GooPIR queries. Anti-tracking is an ongoing area of re-
search and recently in [33] an anti-tracking browser called
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 3
TrackingFree was reported to be effective at disrupting all
of the trackers in the Alexa top-500 list. Self-regulation has
also proven problematic, in [34], six different privacy tools,
intended to limit advertising due to behavioural profiling, are
assessed. The tools assessed implement a variety of tactics
including cookie blocking, site blacklisting and Do-Not-Track
(DNT) headers. DNT headers were found to be ineffective in
tests at protecting against adverts based on user profiling.
Examples of unsubstantiated and misleading claims by
providers of technology to enhance individual privacy are
common, [35], [36]. Concerns about objective evaluation of
the claims by providers of such technologies have attracted the
attention of Government, where the need for “Awareness and
education of the users . . . ” is identified in [37] as a key step
to building trust and acceptance of privacy technologies for
individuals. Accountability and enforcement of accountability
for privacy policy is also attracting attention. Regulatory
requirements for data handling in industries such as Health-
care (HIPPA) and Finance (GLBA) are well established. The
position with respect to handling of data collected by online
recommender systems is less clear. In [3], the author reviews
computational approaches to specification and enforcement of
privacy policies at large scale.
Our contribution in this paper is orthogonal to the
contributions in the works discussed here. We address
the complimentary challenge of privacy monitoring by
detecting possible inappropriate use of personal user
data by observing personalised outputs. In this respect
our approach can be deployed in conjunction with the
technologies mentioned.
III. GENERAL SETUP
A. Threat Model
The setup we consider is that of a general user of a commer-
cial, for-profit online search engine. The relationship between
the user, denoted U , and the online system, denoted by S, is
based on mutual utility where both parties obtain something
useful from the interaction – U gets useful information and
recommendations – while S gets an opportunity to “up-
sell” to U through targeted content such as advertising. As
a commercial business, S recognises cost per user interaction
and responsiveness of service are critical to competitiveness.
Accordingly content based on user profiling is intended to
adapt dynamically to the changing interests of U . U is gen-
erally informed regarding good personal privacy practice and
is alert to unwanted or embarrassing personalisation. When U
detects threats to her privacy she wishes to assess her ability
to plausibly deny her interest in compromising content to
avoid awkward social implications. The relationship between
U and S is generally described as “honest but curious” in the
literature. Accordingly we will refer to S as an observer rather
than the more traditional adversary.
Let {c1, . . . , cN} denote a set of sensitive categories of
interest to U , e.g. bankruptcy, cancer, addiction, etc. Gather
all other uninteresting categories into a catch-all category
denoted c0. The set C = {c0, c1, . . . , cN} is complete in
the sense that all user topic interests can be represented as
subsets of C with the usual set operations. We are interested
Fig. 1. Overview of user–search engine interaction
in threats from search engine learning that compromise the
ability of U to plausibly deny their interest in sensitive topics.
We will assess threats to plausible deniability by testing if
content appearing on search result pages can be attributed to
interest in a specific topic ci ∈ C, versus interest in any other
topic, on the balance of probabilities.
We treat S as a black-box with internal state unknown to U .
As a starting point, our initial assumption is that S is motivated
to use its internal state of knowledge of U when producing
personalised outputs for U , thereby revealing something about
its internal state.
Assumption 1 (Revealing Observations) A search engine
selects personalised page content, such as adverts, it believes
are aligned with our interests.
When a search engine infers that a particular advertising
category is likely to be of interest to a user, and it is more
likely to generate click through and sales, it is obliged to
use this information when selecting which adverts to display.
This suggests that, by examining advert content recommended
by the search engine, it is possible to detect evidence of
sensitive topic profiling by the search engine. Assumption 1
is fundamental to the application of our approach in that, if
S does not produce content that reveals evidence of learning
then, since S is a black-box in our model, our approach has
nothing to say about observer learning. In summary, we rely on
the observer to show his hand through adverts – our approach
can only observe what is shown. In practice this does not
appear to be a significant limitation with regard to many topics
regarded as sensitive to users. In our experiments we observe
an average of 2 − 3 adverts per probe query with less than
10% of probe queries resulting in no advert content. We also
note that our scope is limited to examining advert content. We
note that in addition to adverts commercial search engines also
typically provide additioenal personalised content that could
also be tested for evidence of learning, for example Google
provides a variety of personalised content such as “top stories”,
related Tweets. However we leave consideration of these as
future work.
A user interacts with a search engine by issuing a query,
receiving a web page in response and then clicking on one or
more items in the response. In the case of web-search, a single
such interaction, labeled with index j, consists of a query,
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response page, item-click triple, denoted ωj = (qj , pj , lj).
We model construction of a query qj as selection of words
from a generally available dictionary denoted D. We assume
that words in D are matched to topics in C. The word–topic
category matching is not unique and words may be matched to
multiple topic categories. A user session of length k > 0 steps
consists of a sequence of k individual steps, and is denoted
{ωk}k≥1. The sequence of interactions {ωk}k≥1 is jointly
observed by the user and the search engine – and perhaps
several other third-party observers. The relationship between
prior and posterior background knowledge at each step k is
{ωk,Ek−1} = Ek, k = 1, 2, . . . (1)
where E0 denotes the initial background knowledge state of
S at the beginning of a session immediately before ω1 is
observed. The detail of E0 is unknown to U who treats S as
a black-box. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between user
and search engine in our model.
Let the random variable X¯ with sample space {0, 1}N
represent user interest in categories in C during a session. A
value of 1 in element i of X¯ indicates evidence is detected of
user interest in topic ci.
After each step k of a query session, S can construct a pos-
terior probability distribution for X¯, namely, for x¯ ∈ {0, 1}N
P(X¯ = x¯ |Ωk = ωk,Ek) = P(X¯ = x¯ |Ek+1) (2)
We use Ωk to represent the observation at step k, so that Ωk =
ωk indicates ωk is observed at step k.
The individual interest vector for topic i is denoted c¯i, a
vector with a single 1 in the ith position and 0 in all other
positions. The probability of that a user is interested only in
topic i at step k of a session and the posterior probability of
detecting evidence that a user is interested only in topic i at
query step k, conditioned on observing ωk and background
knowledge Ek, are
P(X¯ = c¯i|Ek) and P(X¯ = c¯i|Ωk = ωk, Ek)
respectively. Since C contains all possible topics:
N∑
i=0
P(X¯ = c¯i|Ek) = 1, k = 1, 2, . . .
B. Example: Single Sensitive Category
To illustrate mathematical results as we go, we use a
simple ideal model, consisting of a single sensitive category,
as an illustrative example. We will refer to it as the
Single Sensitive Category (SSC) model. The single sensitive
topic is denoted c1 and the catch-all, non-sensitive topic
representing every other topic that is not part of the
sensitive topic is denoted co.
Suppose U can issue queries related to either of two
topics {c1, co} denoting sensitive and non-sensitive interests
respectively. S models the process by which U draws
queries according to an initial probability model
P(X¯ = c1|E0) := ps0, P(X¯ = co|E0) := pn0 (3)
with p1 + p0 = 1. On observing a query from U at step k
the observer S outputs one of {ωsk, ωnk } according to the
associated conditional probabilities at step k given by
P(Ωk = ωsk|X¯ = c1, Ek) = P(Ωk = ωnk |X¯ = co, Ek) := pik
P(Ωk = ωnk |X¯ = c1, Ek) = P(Ωk = ωsk|X¯ = co, Ek) := 1− pik
(4)
The SSC model is deliberately simple as the intention is to
illustrate mathematical concepts. The model is generally
useful for exploring black-box interactions and can be
readily extended to include more sophisticated scenarios
such as allowing U to select from multiple topics, as would
happen when U attempts to obfuscate her interests by
switching topics.
C. Plausible Deniability
Our threat assessment model is based on plausible deniability.
Informally, the user activity observed by the search engine
exhibits plausible deniability when, with high probability, is
consistent with the user being interested in any one of several
topics at least one of which is not sensitive for the user. That
is, the user activity supports reasonable doubt about the user’s
actual interest in a given sensitive topic.
In our setup, the topics are ci ∈ C while the observed
activity is {ωj}kj=1 at step k in a session (i.e. the queries,
search result pages and associated user clicks). We formalise
plausible deniability as follows.
Definition 1 ((,m)–Plausible Deniability ) For privacy
parameters  > 0 and m > 0 and a set of N + 1 topics
C = {c0, . . . cN}, a user with a true user interest vector
x¯ ∈ {0, 1}N+1 is said to have (,m)–Plausible Deniability at
step k in the query session, if, for observations {ωj}kj=1, made
at each step j = 1, . . . k of a session by an observer possessing
initial background knowledge E0 at the beginning of the
session, there exist at least m− 1 other x¯i ∈ {0, 1}N+1 \ {x¯}
such that
e− < Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) < e (5)
where
Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) =
P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = x¯,E0)
P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = x¯i,E0)
(6)
For (5) to be well-defined, all probabilities are assumed to be
non-zero. In practice, this is not a significant restriction since
categories with zero probability are gathered into the catch-all
topic c0. By applying the chain-rule for conditional probability,
(6) can be rewritten as
Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) = P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = x¯, E0)P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = x¯i, E0)
=
k−1∏
j=0
P(Ωk−j = ωk−j |X¯ = x¯,Ωk−j−1 = ωk−j−1, . . .Ω1 = ω1, E0)
P(Ωk−j = ωk−j |X¯ = x¯i,Ωk−j−1 = ωk−j−1, . . .Ω1 = ω1, E0)
(7)
=
k−1∏
j=0
P(Ωk−j = ωk−j | X¯ = x¯, Ek−j)
P(Ωk−j = ωk−j | X¯ = x¯i, Ek−j) =
k−1∏
j=0
dk−j(x¯, x¯i, ωk−j)
(8)
where
dk(x¯, x¯i, ωj) :=
P(Ωj = ωj | X¯ = x¯,Ej)
P(Ωk = ωj | X¯ = x¯i,Ej)
(9)
is the incremental change in (,m)–Plausible Deniability aris-
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ing from the single observation ωk at step k of the session.
In the case of the SSC model, there are two topics –
sensitive and non-sensitive – so that U can at best hope
for (,m = 2)–Plausible Deniability for the sensitive topic,
in which case (9) can be written as
dk(c
1, co, ωsj ) =
P(Ωj = ωsj | X¯ = c1,Ej)
P(Ωk = ωsj | X¯ = co,Ej)
=
pij
1− pij (10)
when S emits a sensitive output ωsj at step j, and
dk(c
1, co, ωsj ) =
1− pij
pij
(11)
when a non-sensitive output is emitted at step j. Substitut-
ing these values into (8) and assuming a sensitive outputs
and k − a non-sensitive outputs in a session of length k,
let ks denote the sub-sequence of steps where sensitive
outputs are detected and kn = [k] \ ks be the steps where
non-sensitive outputs are detected so that
Dk(c1, co, {ωj}kj=1) =
∏
i∈ks
pii
1− pii
∏
j∈kn
1− pij
pij
(12)
D. Comparison with Other Anonymity Measures
Intuitively, Definition 1 is similar to k–anonymity in that an
observer can only explain observations {ωj}kj=1 to within
a generalised set consisting of at least k = m topic vectors
with probability bounded by the choice of . Definition 1
differs from regular k–anonymity in requiring both upper
and lower bounds in (6) since evidence of loss of interest
in a sensitive topic may be as revealing and potentially
embarrassing as evidence of increase of interest.
Definition 1 can also be compared with a slightly
weaker form of Differential Privacy. Informally, making
an observation should not make S significantly more, or
less, confident of user interest in a particular sensitive
topic.
From (9) the incremental change due to a single obser-
vation Ωj = ωj is
P(Ωj = ωj | X¯ = x¯,Ej)
P(Ωk = ωj | X¯ = x¯i,Ej)
=
P(X¯ = x¯ |Ωj = ωj ,Ej)
P(X¯ = x¯i |Ωk = ωj ,Ej)
(13)
by applying Bayes Theorem. Since (9) is bounded above
and below for at least m − 1 other xi when Definition 1
holds, it follows that
e− <
P(X¯ = x¯ |Ωj = ωj ,Ej)
P(X¯ = x¯i |Ωk = ωj ,Ej)
< e (14)
for at least m − 1 other topic vectors xi – but not
necessarily for all topic vectors. In which case we say
that m–Differential Privacy holds for  > 0 whenever
Definition 1 holds, meaning that for any topic vector x it is
impossible to distinguish it from at least m−1 other topic
vectors in {0, 1}N+1. This is a slightly weaker statement
of Differential Privacy from the usual global definition.
E. Testing for Plausible Deniability
The following indistinguishability definition of privacy risk
measures the change in belief by a search engine due to
inference from observed user events relative to its prior belief
conditioned on the background data available at the start of
the query session. It is adapted from work begun in [2] and
using it allows us to adapt tools originally developed there.
Definition 2 (-Indistinguishability ) For a privacy parame-
ter  > 0, a user with interest vector x¯ ∈ {0, 1}N is said to be
s said to be -Indistinguishable with respect to an observation
of user actions ωk at step k, if
e− ≤Mk(x¯, ωk) ≤ e (15)
where
Mk(x¯, ωk) =
P(X¯ = x¯ |Ωk = ωk,Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯ |E0)
(16)
=
P(X¯ = x¯ |Ek+1)
P(X¯ = x¯ |E0)
(Applying (1)) (17)
is called the -Indistinguishability score of the interest vector
x¯ for observation ωk and background knowledge Ek at step
k.
In other words, for -Indistinguishability to hold at step k of a
query session, the conditional posterior distribution should be
approximately equal to the prior distribution at the beginning
of the query session for the true interests of the user. To ensure
(16) is well defined we assume all probabilities in (16) are non-
zero, so that 0 < Mk(x¯, ωk) < ∞. Expression (16) implies
that if -Indistinguishability holds at step k for an interest
vector x¯, then e− < (Mk−1(x¯, ωk))−1 < e.
The next result provides the necessary connection between
-Indistinguishability and (,m)–Plausible Deniability to ap-
ply tools, developed in [2] for -Indistinguishability , to
(,m)–Plausible Deniability .
Proposition III.1 If -Indistinguishability holds on a subset
I ⊆ {0, 1}N+1 for  > 0 for step k and the initial step 1,
then (4,m)–Plausible Deniability holds on I for m ≤ |B|.
Furthermore
Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) =
Mk(x¯1, ωk)
Mk(x¯2, ωk)
M1(x¯2, ω1)
M1(x¯1, ω1)
(18)
Proof Assume -Indistinguishability holds on I ⊆ {0, 1}N+1
then for any x¯1, x¯2 ∈ I. From (9)
dk(x¯1, x¯2, ωk) =
P(Ωk = ωk|X¯ = x¯1, Ek)
P(Ωk = ωk|X¯ = x¯2, Ek)
=
P(X¯ = x¯1|Ωk = ωk, Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯1|Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯2|Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯2|Ωk = ωk, Ek) (19)
(Bayes Theorem)
=
P(X¯ = x¯1|Ωk = ωk, Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯1|E0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
P(X¯ = x¯1|E0)
P(X¯ = x¯1|Ek)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
× . . .
. . .× P(X¯ = x¯2|Ek)
P(X¯ = x¯2|E0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
P(X¯ = x¯2|E0)
P(X¯ = x¯2|Ωk = ωk, Ek)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
(20)
=
Mk(x¯1, ωk)Mk−1(x¯2, ωk−1)
Mk−1(x¯1, ωk−1)Mk(x¯2, ωk)
(21)
Where expressions (b) and (c) in (20) are
(Mk−1(x¯1, ωk−1))−1 and (Mk−1(x¯2, ωk−1))−1 respectively
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from the definition in (17).
Therefore from the definition of Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) in (8)
Dk(x¯, x¯i, {ωj}kj=1) =
Mk(x¯1, ωk)
Mk(x¯2, ωk)
M1(x¯2, ω1)
M1(x¯1, ω1)
(22)
So that (18) holds. Since individual elements in (22)
satisfy -Indistinguishability for  > 0 it follows that
(4,m)–Plausible Deniability holds as required.
Proposition III.1 provides a basic strategy for asserting when
(,m)–Plausible Deniability holds. By establishing a value of
 for which a collection of topics C = {c0, . . . cN} satisfies
-Indistinguishability , (4,m)–Plausible Deniability follows
with, at least, m = |C|= N + 1. This is a minimum guarantee,
as there may be topics for which -Indistinguishability fails but
(4,m)–Plausible Deniability holds. In our experiments we
test whether U can plausibly deny whether or not observed
actions can be uniquely associated with interest in a given
sensitive topic ci versus interest in “any other” topic in C\{ci},
so that m = 2.
For a topic ci ∈ C the expression for
(,m)–Plausible Deniability becomes
Dk(c¯i, c¯−i, {ωj}kj=1) := P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1|X¯ = c¯i, E0)P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1|X¯ = c¯−i, E0)
(23)
where c¯−i denotes the topic interest vector representing inter-
est in the topics C \ {ci}.
The following result connects Dk(c¯i, c¯−i, {ωj}kj=1) to vari-
ation in probabilities
Proposition III.2 If (,m)–Plausible Deniability holds for
c¯i and c¯−i with  > 0 and m = 2 then
|P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = c¯i,E0)
− P(Ωk = ωk, . . .Ω1 = ω1 | X¯ = c¯−i,E0)|
≥
∣∣∣∣log(Mk(x¯1, ωk)Mk(x¯2, ωk)M1(x¯2,Ωk−1)M1(x¯1,Ωk−1)
)∣∣∣∣ (24)
And so
∗ :=
∣∣∣∣log(Mk(x¯1, ωk)Mk(x¯2, ωk)M1(x¯2, ωk−1)M1(x¯1, ωk−1)
)∣∣∣∣ (25)
is a lower bound for the best possible achievable level of
(,m)–Plausible Deniability .
Proof If (,m)–Plausible Deniability holds for  > 0 then∣∣log(Dk(c¯i, c¯−i, {ωj}kj=1))∣∣ <  (26)
so that |log(Dk(c¯i, c¯−i, {ωj}kj=1))| is a lower bound for
all  > 0 for which (,m)–Plausible Deniability holds.
The result follows by substituting the expression in (21) for
Dk(c¯i, c¯−i, {ωj}kj=1) in (26).
Proposition III.2 will be used later to create an estimator
for ∗ that can be measured in experiments. From now on
we simplify our discussion to the case m = 2 and so
experimental results are reported accordingly for the two-topic
case, {ci, c−i}.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Preliminaries
During testing we wish to use (25) to create an
estimator, we call PDE, to estimate the level of
(,m)–Plausible Deniability afforded. Since estimating
the quantities in (25) uses PRI, we recap the bare essentials
of PRI and refer the reader to [2] for more details.
To test for learning PRI injects a predefined probe query into
a stream of “true” queries during a query session. In this way,
any differences detected in advert content in response to probe
queries can be compared to identify evidence of learning.
An ideal probe should not disrupt the learning process of S.
Denote the event a probe query is selected from D at step k+1
by Ωk+1 = ωPk+1. We formalise the notion of an ideal probe
query by demanding that observing Ωk+1 = ωPk+1 should
be conditionally independent of the user topic X¯ given the
existing background knowledge of the observer
P(X¯ = c¯i,Ωk+1 = ωPk+1 |Ek)
= P(X¯ = c¯i, |Ek) · P(Ωk+1 = ωPk+1 |Ek) (27)
and so observing the probe query and associated clicks does
not provide any more information to the observer about the
interests of U than the current background knowledge already
provides. From (27)
P(X¯ = c¯i |Ωk+1 = ωPk+1,Ek)
= P(X¯ = c¯i, |Ek) (28)
In practice, choosing an ideal probe query is achieved by
selecting words from D that match words for several topics
in C so that it is not possible to associate a single topic in C
with the probe query.
Construction of PRI is based on several assumptions, the
first of these assumptions is that the background knowledge
at the first step of a query session, E1, provides sufficient
description of background knowledge for all subsequent steps
of that query session, Ek.
Assumption 2 (Sufficiently Informative Responses) Let
K ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·} label the sub-sequence of steps at which a
probe query is issued. At each step k ∈ K at which a probe
query is issued,
P(X¯ = c¯i|Ωk = ωk,Ek)
P(X¯ = c¯i|E1)
=
P(X¯ = c¯i|Ωk = ωk,E1)
P(X¯ = c¯i|E1)
(29)
for each topic ci ∈ C.
So that it is not necessary to explicitly use knowledge of
the search history during the current session when estimating
Mk for a topic c as this is already reflected in the search
engine response, ωk, with the initial background knowledge
E1 capturing background knowledge up to the start of the
session, at step k. Assumption 2 greatly simplifies estimation
as it means we do not have to take account of the full search
history, but requires that the response to a query reveals search
engine learning of interest in sensitive category c which has
occurred. Assumption 2 was called the “Informative Probe”
assumption in [2].
The next assumption is that adverts are selected to reflect
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search engine belief in user interests. In this way adverts
are assumed to be the principal way in which search engine
learning is revealed. Given this assumption, conditional depen-
dence on ωk can be replaced with dependence on the adverts
appearing on the screen.
Assumption 3 (Revealing Adverts) In the search engine re-
sponse to a query at step k it is the adverts ak on a response
page which primarily reveal learning of sensitive categories.
P(X¯ = c¯i|Ωk = ωk,E1) = P(X¯ = c¯i|ak,E1), k ∈ K (30)
for each topic ci ∈ C.
We estimate background knowledge E1 by selecting a
training data-set, denoted T , consisting of (label, advert) pairs;
where the label is the category in C associated with the
corresponding advert. For example, when testing for evidence
of a single, sensitive topic, called “Sensitive”, T contains
items labeled “Sensitive’ or “Other”, where “Other” is the
label for the uninteresting, catch-all topic c0. In this way T
approximates the prior observation evidence available at the
start of the query session so that T is an estimator for E1.
Text processing of T produces a dictionary D of keyword
features. This processing removes common English language
high-frequency words and maps each of the remaining key-
words to a stemmed form by removing standard prefixes and
suffixes such as “–ing” and “–ed”. The dictionary D represents
an estimate of the known universe of keywords according to
the background knowledge contained in the training data.
Text appearing in the adverts in a response page is
preprocessed in the same way as T to produce a se-
quence of keywords from D for each advert; denoted W =
{w1, w2, · · · , w|W |}. Words not appearing in D are ignored
in our experimental setup for simplicity since sessions are
short. In an operational setting it is possible, for example, to
update D when new keywords are encountered and refactor
E1 accordingly.
Let nD(w|W ) := |{i : i ∈ {1, · · · , |W |}, wi = w}|, denote
the number of times an individual keyword w ∈ D occurs in
a sequence W = {w1, w2, · · · , w|W |}. The relative frequency
of an individual keyword w ∈ W is therefore,
φD(w|W ) = nD(w|W )∑
w∈D nD(w|W )
(31)
recalling that only keywords w appearing D are admissible
due to the text preprocessing in our setup.
Let ci ∈ C be a sensitive topic of interest, and let T (ci)
denote the subset of T where the labels corresponds to ci. Let
T (C) denote the set of adverts labelled for any topic in C. The
PRI estimator for Mk(x¯, ωk) given adverts ak appearing on
the result page for query number k, is1:
M̂k(c¯i, ωk) =
∑
w∈D
(
φD(w|T (ci))
φD(w|T (C)) · φD(w|ak)
)
(32)
where we concatenate all of the advert text on page k into
a single sequence of keywords and ψD(w|ak) is the relative
1Note that in [2] the expression given for M̂k(c¯i, ωk) is incorrect and is
corrected here.
frequency of w within this sequence. Similarly, concatenating
all of the keywords in the training set T (ci), respectively
T (C), into a single sequence then φD(w|T (ci)), respectively
φD(w|T (C)), is the relative frequency of w within that se-
quence.
B. Tuning the PRI Estimator
The quantity ψD(w|ak) in the expression for the PRI esti-
mator, (32), is problematic when the adverts ak on page k
do not contain any of the topic keywords in dictionary D i.e.
when ak = ∅, indicating there is no detectable evidence of
a particular topic. To be consistent with the definition of -
Indistinguishability in Section 2, should result in a PRI score
of one for that topic. We therefore replace φD(w|ak) with
ψ0,D(w|ak) =
{
φD(w|ak) if ak 6= ∅
1 otherwise
(33)
Training data is based on a sample of all possible adverts for a
particular topic. We may be unlucky so that during the training
phase we fail to observe adverts containing infrequently oc-
curring keywords for a particular topic. In this case the relative
frequency of such a keyword will be zero and it will not
contribute when estimating PRI if encountered in an advert.
To address this we introduce a Laplace smoothing parameter
λ as follows
nλ,D(w|W ) = λ+ nD(w|W ) (34)
φλ,D(w|W ) = nλ,D(w|W )∑
w∈D nλ,D(w|W )
(35)
ψλ,D(w|ak) =
{
φλ,D(w|a) if ak 6= ∅
1 otherwise
(36)
The parameter 0 ≤ λ < 1 enforces a minimum frequency
of 1/|D| on every keyword. The expression (32) is adjusted
correspondingly to give a new estimator we call PRI+:
M̂k(c¯i, ωk) =
∑
w∈D
(
φλ,D(w|T (ci))
φλ,D(w|T (C)) · ψλ,D(w|ak)
)
(37)
We will use the PRI+ estimator, given by (37), from now on
in this paper, unless stated otherwise. In our experiments we
find empirically, through verification with the training data,
that choosing the parameter λ = 0.001 worked well.
C. The PDE Estimator
Substituting the PRI+ estimator M̂k for Mk in (25) gives the
PDE estimator
̂∗,k =
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
M̂k(c¯i, ωk)
M̂k(c¯−i, ωk)
M̂1(c¯−i, ω1)
M̂1(c¯i, ω1)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (38)
From Proposition III.2, the PDE estimator in (38) can
be interpreted directly as the best possible level of
(,m)–Plausible Deniability a user can claim in the case
m = 2. We report the maximum value of PDE measured
by probe step in our experiments to show the worst possible
(,m)–Plausible Deniability scenario for U . We also report
the median value of PDE as a representative bound for
approximately 50% of the samples. An example of reporting
is shown in Table I for the reference topic “gay”.For example,
from Table I, a reported maximum value of PDE of 47% in
the second column indicates that the difference in probabilities
that U is uniquely interest in the reference topic versus being
interested in any other topic is at least 47% in the worst case
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TABLE I
MEASURED ̂∗,kFOR REFERENCE TOPIC VERSUS ANY OTHER TOPIC,
REPORTED AS “MAX (MEDIAN)”, BY PROBE QUERY SEQUENCE
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
gay 64 (33) 47 ( 5) 72 (25) 48 (25) 48 (19)
by probe step 5. The median value of 25% in parentheses
in the Probe 3 and 4 columns indicates that the difference
in probabilities can be expected to be at least 25% in 50%
of cases by probes 3 and 4. Overall the results suggest
that (,m)–Plausible Deniability is unlikely to constitute a
reasonable defence in this case.
Reported values of PDE may increase, or decrease, during
a session as individual queries are judged as more, or less,
revealing by the PDE estimator. Inspection of the query scripts
generated for the topic ci = Gay, for example, shows that the
queries associated with probe step 3 are same sex relationships
and how do i know if I’m gay, both of which appear revealing.
The queries from the test script corresponding to probe steps
4 and 5 are HIV symptoms, HIV treatment, HIV men and aids
men which may not point as distinctly to specific interest in
the ci = Gay as they could reasonably be associated with
health concerns.
The zeroth probe in a session is always run first, before
any other query, to establish a baseline PRI+ score for the
session. As a result the measured PDE values for the zeroth
probe is always 0 for both maximum and median values and
is not reported in our results.
One popular approach to designing defences of
(,m)–Plausible Deniability is to attempt to hide in the
crowd. For example, by injecting varying degrees of noise
in the stream of observations {ωj} in the hope that S will
not detect the true sub-stream of sensitive events. In [2], the
authors observe that varying click patterns is seen to change
the absolute volume of adverts appearing on a page. As both
user clicks and queries are potential indicators of user interest
for an observer we test injected noise from both queries and
clicks as possible defence strategies.
An alternative tactic is to invert the previous approach by
instead attempting to hide in plain sight. By choosing a non-
sensitive proxy topic, chosen to attract personalised content U
can then carefully hide true, sensitive queries in a stream of
proxy topic queries. By demonstrating clear interest in a proxy
non-sensitive topic U may tip the balance of probability toward
the proxy topic by drawing the attention of the observer S.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Preliminaries
To facilitate easy comparison we use the same experimental
data collection setup as [2]. We summarise the key elements
here with additional detail in the Appendix and refer the reader
to [2] for full details.
User interest topic categories taken from [2], are used in our
experiments. Of the user interest topics, (i) ten are sensitive
categories associated with subjects generally identified as
causes of discrimination (medical condition, sexual orientation
etc) or sensitive personal conditions (gambling addiction,
financial problems etc), (ii) a further sensitive topic is related
to London as a specific destination location, providing an
obviously interesting yet potentially sensitive topic that a
recommender system might track, (iii) the last topic is a catch-
all category labeled “Other”.
To construct sequences of queries for use in test sessions,
we select a probe query, providing a predefined sampling
point for data collection. Numbering the probes in a session
starting from 0, the zeroth query issued in every session is a
probe query. The zeroth probe is used to establish the baseline
for calculations of the PDE estimator for subsequent probe
queries. The PDE estimator, from (38), of the zeroth probe in
a session is 0 and so is not included in reports of experimental
results. Measurements of PDE values are reported for each
of the probe queries 1–5 during experiments providing a
consistent sample for analysis.
In our experiments, when implementing the “Proxy Topic”
defence model, we choose three uninteresting, proxy topics
likely to attract adverts, namely tickets for music concerts,
searching for bargain vacations and buying a new car.
All scripts were run for 3 registered users and 1 anonymous
user on the Google search engine, yielding a data set consisting
of 21, 861 probe queries in total across all of the test user
interest topics. Test data was divided into individual test data
sets based on different test configurations with each test data
set consisting of approximately 1, 000 probe queries.
A separate hold-back was created for a common training
data set of approximately 1, 000 queries. The PDE estimator
in (38) uses the training data-set to model the prior background
knowledge E0. We do not re-train PDE during testing as new
adverts are encountered. Experimental measurements of PDE
are with respect to the common training set for consistent
comparison.
All queries in a test session were automatically labelled
with the intended topic of the test session as given by the
query script used. For example, all queries from a session
about “prostate“ are labeled as “prostate” including probe
queries. In this respect the labels capture intended behaviour
of queries, rather than attempting an individual interpretation
of specific query keywords during a user session. Test data
is automatically divided into 7 folds for processing so that,
reported statistics are taken over 7 distinct, randomised sub-
samples of test data.
Before proceeding to testing with PDE, we verify PRI+
by comparing its detection capability with previous results
obtained in [2] for the PRI estimator and compare the
performance of PRI+ with alternative implementations
using Naive Bayes and Support Vector Machine as sensitive
topic detectors.
Comparison results between PRI and PRI+ are shown in
Table VI. and were produced by processing data taken from
[2] but applying the PRI+ estimator to decide which topic
is detected. For comparison with [2], we declare a topic
ci has been detected during a query session, consisting of
5 probe queries, if at least one of the 5 probe queries is
detected as topic ci. For comparison, detection results for the
PRI estimator from Table XIV(b) in [2], are reproduced as
Table VI(b). The True Detection rates using PRI+ estimator
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are better or equal for each topic than the rates reported in
[2]. The False Detection rates are also better or equal in the
case of all topics tested comparing favourably with the results
obtained in [2].
Comparison of PRI+ with alternative implementations
was performed by taking results from Multinomial Naive
Bayes (NB) and Linear SVM (SVM) classifiers to estimate
the probabilities in the definition of Mk in (17). The intent
of the comparison is to determine which of the NB, PRI+
and SVM estimators detect privacy threats, using the
definition of Mk in (17), for test items previously labeled
as “sensitive” by examining the topic of the query used. To
qualify as a privacy threat we choose a value of e > 1.1.
We expect precision to be substantially less than 100% for
all estimators because the threshold will filter out weaker
detections where 1.0 < e ≤ 1.1. Other than varying how
Fig. 2. Comparison of Naive Bayes, PRI+ and Support Vector Machine
estimators. (as Threat Detection Rate by Topic)
Mk was estimated, all other inputs and calculations were
identical. A common test data set was constructed by
selecting 5,500 result pages for each sensitive topic and then
randomly selecting an additional 5,500 result pages labeled
for the non-sensitive topic. In this way each sensitive topic
had a balanced verification data set of 11,000 labeled
items. Each verification data-set was divided randomly into
20% − 80% test–training sets and calculations repeated 5
times for 5-fold verification of each of the NB, PRI+ and
SVM estimators. The Multinomial Naive Bayes and Linear
SVC modules from the Python Sklearn package were
used to construct the NB and SVM estimators, [38]. After
common preprocessing each of the NB, PRI+ and SVM
classifiers were trained and probability estimates captured
for the 5-fold test data-sets. A threat is declared “detected”
if the calculated valued ofMk for the sensitive topic exceeds
1.0. Precision of sensitive topic threat detection is shown by
topic in Figure 2 for the NB, PRI+ and SVM approaches.
The results Figure 2 indicate that that the PRI+ estima-
tor detects significantly more true-positive detection results
than either of the NB or SVM estimators for all sensitive
topics tested. The initial detection sensitivity of each of
these estimators is influenced by the labelling assigned to
examples in the training set. We adopt the perspective that
privacy tools should err on the side of caution so that high
detection sensitivity in the initial “out of the box” stage is
a prudent approach. In a real-world application of PRI+
the user would provide incremental training examples over
time reflecting their tolerance of privacy risk and so tune
PRI+.
B. Establishing a Baseline
We begin with a sequences of queries, interleaved with probe
queries, in what we term a “no click, no noise” model.
Here there is no injected noise and no items are clicked
on any of the search results pages. This model provides
a baseline, where the queries alone are available to the
recommender to learn about a user session as it progresses.
Measurements of PDE for all topics using the “no click, no
noise” model are shown in Table II. For the health-related
TABLE II
MEASURED ̂∗,kFOR REFERENCE TOPIC VERSUS ANY OTHER TOPIC,
REPORTED AS “MAX (MEDIAN)”, BY PROBE QUERY SEQUENCE
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 56 (52) 56 (52) 56 (52) 56 (52) 56 (52)
bankrupt 1 ( 1) 55 (43) 55 (39) 58 (48) 56 (48)
diabetes 40 (38) 40 (38) 40 (38) 40 (38) 40 (38)
disabled 9 ( 9) 9 ( 9) 9 ( 9) 40 (40) 40 (33)
divorce 41 (31) 75 (65) 56 (46) 79 (68) 79 (68)
gambling 16 (12) 18 (16) 66 ( 4) 57 (17) 18 ( 3)
gay 64 (33) 47 ( 5) 72 (25) 48 (25) 48 (19)
location 10 ( 2) 11 ( 3) 11 (10) 18 ( 7) 18 ( 9)
payday 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 21 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2)
prostate 52 (17) 52 (17) 52 (17) 52 (17) 52 (17)
unemployed 7 ( 5) 7 ( 6) 7 ( 6) 13 ( 7) 7 ( 7)
(a) No Click, No Noise
topics Anorexia, Diabetes, Prostate, Bankrupt, Divorced, Gay
the reported results are high, indicating lack of plausible
deniability for each of these topics. It is concerning that
personal circumstances, health status and sexual orientation
appear to be the most revealing topics according to our
experiments. In the case of the topic Disabled there is more
cause of concern about (,m)–Plausible Deniability as the
session progresses. On inspection of the associated query script
this appears to be again related to the specificity of the queries
at each probe step. At the beginning of this script the queries
are related to availability of services – for example, locations
of disabled parking – while later queries are more specific to
named conditions – for example, treatment for spina bifida.
The topics {Location, Payday, Unemployed} appear
among the topics of least concern from the perspective of
(,m)–Plausible Deniability . Both of the topics Payday and
Unemployed asked queries about availability of social support
services whereas queries for the topic Bankrupt asked about
availability of paid professional services such as lawyers and
accountants. It is perhaps an illustration of the motivations of
a for-profit service where users seeking social supports are of
less interest than users seeking expensive paid services.
Overall, measurements of PDE in experiments appear to
agree with expectations from inspection of the underlying
queries. Our results suggest that queries are a strong signal
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to the observer of user interest, and that estimates from
PDE appear to distinguish queries that are strongly revealing
of specific topic interest from more generic queries where
plausible deniability is clearer.
C. The Effect of Random Noise Injection
Following from Section III-C, we now consider the impact
of injecting non-informative queries chosen at random from
our popular query list into a user session. We simply refer to
these as “random noise” queries. We consider three levels of
random noise queries for testing purposes:
“Low Noise” The automation scripts select uninteresting
queries uniformly at random from the top-query list and inject
a single random noise query after every topic-specific query
so that the “signal-to-noise ratio” of sensitive to noise queries
in this case is 1 : 1.
“Medium Noise” Here the automation scripts inject two
randomly selected queries after each topic-specific query for
a signal to noise ration of 1 : 2.
“High Noise” In this noise-model with the highest noise
setting, three random noise queries are injected, resulting in a
signal-to-noise ratio of 1 : 3.
Note also that the automation scripts were configured to
ensure the relevant number of noise queries was always
injected immediately before each probe query. Our intention
was to construct a “worst case” for detection of learning, where
probe queries are always separated from sensitive user queries
by the specified number of noise queries.
Table III(a-c) shows the measured PDE values for Low,
Medium and High levels of noise respectively for the “no
click” model. The PDE values for all levels of noise are similar
to the “no click, no noise” baseline values in Table II.
Overall, there is no consistent reduction in values across
all topics for all noise levels, indicating that injecting random
noise queries does not have a consistent effect. In some cases,
such as topic Gay, measured values of PDE increase for all
noise levels indicating that noise injection worsens the user’s
ability to assert (,m)–Plausible Deniability .
These results indicate that even the “High Noise” model
fails to reduce the measured values of PDE in a coherent
way, so that injecting random noise has not improved plausible
deniability significantly with any consistency. We conclude
that injection of random noise, even at substantial levels, is not
observed to provide a useful defence for plausible deniability
in our experiments.
D. The Effect of Click Strategies
We now consider whether it is possible to disrupt search engine
learning by careful clicking of the links on response pages.
Intuitively, from the search engine’s point of view, clicking on
links is a form of active feedback by a user and so potentially
informative of user interests. This is especially true when, for
example, a user is carrying out exploratory search where their
choice of keywords is not yet well-tuned to their topic of
interest. Previous studies have also indicated that there is good
reason to believe that user clicks on links are an important
input into recommender system learning. In [2] (Section 6.4),
user clicks emulated using the “Click Relevant” click-model
were reported to result in increases of 60% – 450% in the
TABLE III
MEASURED ̂∗,kFOR REFERENCE TOPIC VERSUS ANY OTHER TOPIC,
REPORTED AS “MAX (MEDIAN)”, BY PROBE QUERY SEQUENCE
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 54 (45) 54 (45) 54 (45) 54 (45) 54 (45)
bankrupt 16 ( 9) 56 (50) 52 (39) 54 (45) 56 (45)
diabetes 46 (35) 46 (35) 46 (35) 46 (35) 46 (35)
disabled 9 ( 3) 9 ( 8) 9 ( 7) 33 ( 7) 40 (32)
divorce 13 ( 7) 123 ( 8) 54 ( 8) 85 ( 6) 85 ( 6)
gambling 18 (16) 18 (16) 52 (18) 18 (10) 18 (18)
gay 73 (61) 73 (70) 76 (46) 79 (74) 79 (70)
location 18 (16) 18 (10) 18 (10) 18 (10) 18 (10)
payday 3 ( 2) 3 ( 2) 4 ( 3) 4 ( 3) 4 ( 3)
prostate 21 (16) 21 (16) 21 (16) 21 (16) 21 (16)
unemployed 7 ( 3) 7 ( 3) 13 ( 9) 13 ( 9) 13 ( 9)
(a) No Click, Low Noise
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 55 (53) 53 (53) 53 (53) 53 (53) 53 (53)
bankrupt 11 ( 8) 48 (33) 51 (43) 52 (38) 52 (38)
diabetes 38 (38) 38 (38) 38 (38) 38 (38) 38 (38)
disabled 4 ( 4) 8 ( 7) 1 ( 1) 40 (36) 40 (36)
divorce 19 ( 9) 65 (31) 44 (31) 72 (50) 72 (50)
gambling 18 (16) 18 (17) 18 (18) 31 ( 3) 18 (10)
gay 89 (68) 89 (69) 88 (64) 93 (73) 93 (64)
location 18 (10) 18 (10) 18 ( 7) 18 ( 7) 10 ( 7)
payday 6 ( 3) 6 ( 3) 6 ( 3) 6 ( 2) 6 ( 1)
prostate 32 (14) 32 (14) 18 (13) 18 (13) 18 (13)
unemployed 13 ( 5) 13 (10) 13 ( 7) 13 ( 9) 7 ( 4)
(b) No Click, Med Noise
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 48 (48) 48 (48) 48 (48) 48 (48) 48 (48)
bankrupt 16 (10) 65 (51) 65 (48) 65 (49) 65 (49)
diabetes 41 (38) 41 (38) 41 (38) 41 (38) 41 (38)
disabled 9 ( 9) 9 ( 9) 9 ( 5) 9 ( 7) 9 ( 8)
divorce 41 (27) 75 (38) 56 (22) 75 (29) 75 (29)
gambling 21 (16) 21 ( 3) 21 ( 4) 29 (16) 18 ( 4)
gay 86 (64) 86 (64) 80 (43) 94 (59) 94 (59)
location 10 (10) 8 ( 8) 8 ( 8) 18 (13) 18 (13)
payday 3 ( 2) 4 ( 2) 4 ( 2) 4 ( 2) 3 ( 1)
prostate 17 (15) 17 (15) 17 (15) 17 (15) 17 (15)
unemployed 10 ( 7) 13 ( 7) 13 ( 7) 13 ( 7) 13 ( 7)
(c) No Click, High Noise
advert content, depending on the “Sensitive’ topic tested.
We consider four different click strategies to emulate a range
of user click behaviours:
“No Click” No items are clicked on in the response page
to a query. This user click-model does not provide additional
user preference information to the recommender system due
to click behaviour. This click model is used in the baseline
measurements presented in Sections V-B.
“Click Relevant” Given the response page to a query, for
each search result and advert we calculate the Term-Frequency
(TF) of the visible text with respect to the keywords associated
with the test session topic of interest. When TF > 0.1 for an
item, the item is clicked, otherwise it is not clicked. This user
click-model provides relevant feedback to the recommender
system about the information goal of the user.
“Click Non-relevant” TF is calculated for each item with
respect to the category of interest for the session in question
as for the “Click Relevant” click-model, except that items are
clicked when the TF score is below the threshold and so they
are deemed non-relevant to the topic, that is when TF ≤ 0.1.
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This user click-model attempts to confuse the recommender
system by providing feedback that is not relevant to the true
topic of interest to the user.
“Click All” All items on the response page for a query are
clicked. This user click-model gives the recommender system
a “noisy” click signal, including clicks on items relevant and
non-relevant to the user’s information goal.
“Click 2 Random Items” Two items appearing on the re-
sponse page for a query are selected uniformly at random
with replacement and clicked.
In all cases, when uninteresting, noise queries are included
in a query session, the relevant user click-strategy is also
applied to the result pages of these queries. In this way we
hope to avoid providing an obvious signal to the recommender
system that might differentiate uninteresting queries from
queries related to sensitive topics. Items on the result page in
response to probe queries are not clicked so that the probe
query does not provide any additional information to the
recommender system.
Measure values of PDE are shown in Table IV. As random
noise injection had no observable effect on measurements of
PDE for different click models in experiments, only the “No
Noise” results are presented here for space reasons.
Taken overall, the results in Table IV(a) for the “non-
relevant click, no noise” model suggest clicking on non-
relevant advert items is the best strategy of the click models
tested. The only difference between the “non-relevant click”
model and other click models is that non-relevant items only
are clicked, whereas in other click models it is possible that
relevant items are clicked. It seems reasonable to postulate
that clicking on relevant items provides “fine-tuned” feedback
about user interests which is more informative for the observer.
Clicking on non-relevant items may divert attention to a
modest degree, but not to the extent of masking the sensitive
topic revealed by the query.
Comparing the baseline “No Click” PDE observations in
Table II each of the subtables in Table IV shows similar lack of
consistency to the noise injection models. In out experiments
there is no consistent change observed in PDE across topics
due to variation in the click patterns tested. As with the noise
injection case, there are sporadic increases and decreases in
values of PDE but the lack of overall consistency makes using
click models as a defence impractical.
It would appear in summary, that clicks transmit information
to the observer, but not as consistently as does a revealing
query. Consequently none of the user click-models tested
appear to change the baseline level of plausible deniability
associated with the query in a predictable way so that there
is no globally discernible pattern with which to construct
practical defence tools based on clicks.
E. The Effect of Proxy Topics
The next privacy protection strategy we consider is the in-
troduction of proxy topics. In this case sequences of queries,
with each sequence related to a single proxy topic which is
not sensitive for the user but capable of attracting personalised
advert content, are injected into a user session. The idea
here is that each such sequence of queries emulates a user
TABLE IV
MEASURED PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY VERSUS ANY OTHER TESTED
TOPICS AS PROBABILITY OF INTEREST, BY PROBE QUERY SEQUENCE
WHEN THE TRUE TOPIC OF INTEREST IS “OTHER” WITH RANGE (µ± 3σ)
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 59 (50) 59 (50) 59 (50) 59 (50) 59 (50)
bankrupt 16 ( 8) 65 (42) 65 (36) 59 (40) 54 (38)
diabetes 36 (36) 36 (36) 36 (36) 36 (36) 36 (36)
disabled 7 ( 4) 7 ( 4) 9 ( 9) 40 ( 4) 40 ( 7)
divorce 30 (24) 30 ( 9) 30 ( 9) 30 ( 8) 30 ( 8)
gambling 6 ( 0) 18 (16) 32 (16) 18 (16) 18 ( 5)
gay 92 (51) 92 (77) 78 (51) 94 (72) 94 (80)
location 18 (18) 10 (10) 10 (10) 18 (10) 18 (10)
payday 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 3 ( 2) 3 ( 2) 2 ( 2)
prostate 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17)
unemployed 13 ( 2) 13 ( 4) 13 ( 7) 13 ( 7) 7 ( 6)
(a) Click Relevant, No Noise
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 18 ( 5) 22 (12) 26 ( 5) 31 (13) 32 ( 6)
bankrupt 57 ( 3) 53 (36) 50 (34) 43 (33) 48 (36)
diabetes 4 ( 2) 13 ( 8) 11 ( 8) 5 ( 3) 11 ( 2)
disabled 5 ( 2) 6 ( 2) 9 ( 3) 29 (10) 26 ( 8)
divorce 49 (25) 51 (33) 49 (30) 43 (29) 43 (29)
gambling 6 ( 2) 18 ( 4) 36 (24) 35 (13) 31 (13)
gay 36 (33) 75 (33) 51 (32) 39 (20) 31 (27)
location 9 ( 2) 11 ( 1) 7 ( 2) 6 ( 2) 9 ( 1)
payday 3 ( 3) 3 ( 1) 4 ( 2) 3 ( 2) 4 ( 3)
prostate 55 (38) 68 (36) 65 (48) 61 (48) 64 (42)
unemployed 9 ( 1) 6 ( 6) 7 ( 1) 9 ( 4) 5 ( 2)
(b) Click Non-relevant, No Noise
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 66 (57) 66 (57) 66 (57) 66 (57) 66 (57)
bankrupt 51 (42) 51 (42) 51 (42) 55 (46) 56 (46)
diabetes 35 (35) 35 (35) 35 (35) 35 (35) 35 (35)
disabled 9 ( 9) 9 ( 9) 9 ( 9) 31 (31) 31 (31)
divorce 30 ( 8) 73 (54) 54 (34) 100 (49) 100 (49)
gambling 3 ( 1) 16 (16) 53 (11) 16 ( 6) 6 ( 2)
gay 69 (65) 77 (73) 70 (60) 82 (75) 81 (71)
location 18 (10) 10 ( 6) 10 ( 6) 14 (10) 18 ( 7)
payday 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2) 2 ( 2)
prostate 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17) 17 (17)
unemployed 4 ( 4) 7 ( 7) 7 ( 7) 7 ( 7) 7 ( 6)
(c) Click All, No Noise
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
anorexia 50 (12) 27 ( 9) 26 ( 9) 36 (10) 33 (11)
bankrupt 5 ( 3) 43 (33) 39 (37) 36 (35) 38 (35)
diabetes 38 ( 6) 18 ( 7) 17 ( 5) 17 ( 7) 11 ( 5)
disabled 2 ( 1) 4 ( 1) 5 ( 3) 39 (25) 40 (25)
divorce 24 (17) 37 (31) 37 (31) 35 (25) 35 (25)
gambling 24 ( 0) 7 ( 4) 54 (23) 33 (23) 68 (20)
gay 68 (68) 68 (65) 54 (52) 46 (36) 47 (42)
location 8 ( 8) 8 ( 8) 8 ( 8) 8 ( 8) 8 ( 8)
payday 4 ( 1) 2 ( 2) 4 ( 2) 4 ( 3) 4 ( 4)
prostate 59 (57) 67 (62) 58 (56) 60 (54) 51 (44)
unemployed 4 ( 3) 8 ( 3) 10 ( 4) 3 ( 2) 10 ( 1)
(d) Click 2 Random Items, No Noise
session where the proxy topic is the topic of interest. In this
way we hope to misdirect learning by the search engine of
user interests. The results in Section V-C are relevant here
since they suggest that isolated, individual queries – such
as randomly selected noise queries – tend not to provoke
search engine learning. Our hope is that this can be exploited
by inverting the notion of random noise injection so that
individual sensitive queries are injected as the noise in proxy
topic sessions. Isolated sensitive queries will hopefully not
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provoke learning whereas the larger number of uninteresting
proxy sessions will. In this way we can misdirect learning by
the observer.
In out tests the following proxy topics are used:
Tickets Searching for tickets for events in a well-known local
stadium
Vacation Queries related to a vacation such as flights and
accommodation.
Car Searches by a user seeking to trade in and change their
car.
and related queries are constructed by selecting related key-
words through the same process as was used for the sensitive
topics.
TABLE V
MEASURED PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY VERSUS ANY OTHER TESTED
TOPICS AS PROBABILITY OF INTEREST, BY PROBE QUERY SEQUENCE
WHEN THE TRUE TOPIC OF INTEREST IS “OTHER” WITH RANGE (µ± 3σ)
Reference
Topic Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5
all topics 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0)
(a) All Click and Noise Models
Proxy topic query scripts where constructed by selecting a
sensitive topic, and then selecting an uninteresting proxy topic
from the list of 3 proxy topics. Having decided on a sensitive
query we wish to issue, we select at least three and no more
than four queries related to the proxy topic from a prepared
list of proxy topic queries. We next randomly shuffle the order
of the selected sensitive and proxy topic queries. In this way
there is always a subgroup of at least two proxy topic queries
next to each other in each query session. Finally, for testing
purposes, we place a probe query before and after each block
of 3-4 proxy + 1 sensitive queries to measure changes in PRI+
score. We repeat this exercise using the same proxy topic until
a typical query session consisting of 5 probe queries is created.
Data was collected for 2, 300 such proxy topic sessions.
This included each of the sensitive topics and each of the
click models described in previous sections. The same PRI+
and PDE setup, including the same training set, as before was
used to process the search results.
Measured detection rates are shown in Table V. The mea-
sured probability calculated from PDE is 0 for all topics and
for all click-models tested. That is, we find it is possible to
claim full plausible deniability of interest in all of the topics
tested. Since our detection approach is demonstrated to be
notably sensitive to observer learning in earlier sections, we
can reasonably infer that this result is not due to a defect in the
detection methodology but rather genuinely reflects successful
misdirection of the search engine away from sensitive topics.
This result is encouraging, especially in light of the negative
results in previous sections for other obfuscation approaches.
It suggests use of sequences of queries on uninteresting proxy
topics may provide a defence of plausible deniability. The
trade-offs for the user include the overhead of maintaining
proxy topics and associated queries and the additional re-
sources required to issue proxy topic queries in a consistent
way. However since both of these tasks were readily automated
during our testing it seems reasonable that these trade-offs
could be readily managed by software in a way that is
essentially transparent to the user.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our observations suggest that modern systems, such as
Google, are able to identify user interests with high accuracy,
exploit multiple signals, filter out uninteresting noise queries
and adapt quickly when topics change. Furthermore learning
appears to be sustained over the lifetime of query sessions. The
power and sophistication of these systems make designing a
robust defence of user privacy non-trivial.
The PDE estimator was tested via a comprehensive mea-
surement program using online search engines to show that
topic learning results in measurable impacts on the ability
of a user to deny their interest in all sensitive topics tested.
We find that revealing queries provide a significant signal for
search engine adaptation. While user clicks provide additional
feedback, we do not observe the same degree of associated
learning with click behaviour as is observed with revealing
queries. Overall, testing with PDE suggests that defences
based on random noise injection and variable click models
do not provide a reliable strategy for defence of plausible
deniability.
By contrast, our experiments show that proxy topics that are
uninteresting to the user but capable of generating commercial
content provide observable privacy protection in our exper-
iments. Wrapping sensitive queries in a stream of coherent
proxy topic queries appears to distract the online system into
adapting to the proxy topic while allowing the sensitive query
noise to slip through. Our observation that proxy topics pro-
vide some relief indicates that defence of plausible deniability
is not impossible, but indicates that increasingly sophisticated
approaches are required in the face of ever improving search
engine capability. In choosing proxy topics, for example, a
user must be careful to not stimulate unintended learning of the
proxy topics which may influence the utility of future search
results.
Subtle tactics like proxy topics, that exploit the observer’s
strengths to tip the balance slightly in favour of the user, sug-
gest an interesting avenue for future research. The simplicity
of the approach means it should be possible to extend it in
several ways, for example, by injecting a range of uninteresting
single topic queries as additional noise in the proxy query
stream it may be possible to provide additional guarantees
of privacy such as k-anonymity or differential privacy for the
sensitive topic. More investigation of proxy topics is an
interesting line of future research. Experiments to compare
the effectiveness of different proxy topics including, for
example, inclusion of proxy topics that are more relevant
to the user’s known interests versus proxy topics that
are less relevant to user topics. Similarly proxy topics
with higher commercial value may have more potential
to distract search engine learning than proxy topics with
lower commercial value
As discussed in Section II, user click patterns may be used
by recommender systems to rank page content, placing content
likely to attract user clicks in more prominent positions on
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pages. In our experiments, we observed changes in volume
of advert content on samples of probe query response pages.
There are several plausible avenues of investigation that may
help explain the mechanism behind this, such as user click
patterns and the semantics of the true and noise queries chosen.
The approach taken in this paper does not distinguish between
items based on rank or order on the page. How the semantics
of queries, the interaction between user click-models and the
effect of content ranking may impact user privacy is beyond
the scope of this current paper and an avenue for future
research.
Overall our results point towards an arms race, where search
engine capability is continuously evolving. In this setting,
even if injection of proxy topic sessions were to become
widely deployed then we can reasonably expect search engines
to respond with more sophisticated learning strategies. Our
results also point towards the fact that the text in search
queries plays a key role in search engine learning. While
perhaps obvious, this observation reinforces the user’s need
to be circumspect about the queries that they ask if they want
to avoid search engine learning of their interests.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Lemma 1 For x, y,  ∈ R+ with 0 < x, y < 1
e− <
x
y
< e =⇒ |x− y|<  (39)
Proof Assuming the left hand side of (39) holds
e− <
x
y
< e ⇐⇒ ye− < x and y > xe−
=⇒ y(1− ) < x and y > x(1− ) (Since e−x > 1− x)
⇐⇒ y − x < y and x− y < x
⇐⇒ y − x <  and x− y <  (Since x, y < 1)
⇐⇒ − < x− y <  ⇐⇒ |x− y|< 
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF MEASURED DETECTION RATE OF at least one
INDIVIDUAL “SENSITIVE’ TOPIC IN A SESSION OF 5 PROBES.
Reference
Topic
All
Topics
True Detect 100.0%
False Detect 0.0%
(a) PRI+
Reference
Topic
All
Topics
True Detect 97-100.0%
False Detect 4-8%
(b) PRI
